Environmental modelling

This weekend I started to read Environmental Modeling: An introduction by Jo Smith and Pete Smith. I picked up at the library when I was looking for a book by Carl Walters, on adaptive management, which I also hope to read this week. It caught my attention for being straightforward and easy to digest. So far I have enjoyed it very much, since it has given me new ideas about how to approach my dissertation on the Llobregat River. The material is clearly explained, and the examples provide intuition for the statistical calculations made. The authors also point out the problems, biases or misinterpretations that frequently are made when using environmental models to address real world problems.

PhD Qualifying Exam: Area of Specialty (Question 6)

How might restoration endpoints be identified and what are the political implications for using different methods for identifying and choosing those endpoints?

The selection of restoration endpoints is inherently a political exercise. Some restoration ecologists resist this political interpretation (Packard), and instead argue that their selections are grounded in science. However our understanding of ecosystem fluctuation, evolution and non-equilibrium ecology, suggest that the selection of any particular reference condition is simply the outcome of some political process.

In the United States, restoration movements have sought to restore disturbed sites to their ecological conditions found prior to European settlement. A purely scientific approach to restoration uses apolitical tools from the natural sciences to reconstruct what ecosystems were like in the past. This reconstruction of ecosystems has been the specialty of the field of historical ecology (Eagan & Howell).

This selection of “pre-European settlement” as an endpoint obviates the impacts of native peoples on this continent, but more fundamentally, it ignores that ecosystems are in constant flux and change. The choice to restore a prairie to its conditions in 1800 have no greater scientific merit that the selection of the year 1700, 1500 or 500. Plus, this selection of a particular endpoint implies a desire to freeze time. As if the year in which humans began to modify the ecosystem, coincidentally, Nature had already found its ideal state.

Already, conservation biology is moving away from static ideas and instead framing their work context of evolution and change (Meffe). This more nuanced ecological understanding is common among scholars despite the simple messaging from environmental groups that reinforce static ecological pictures. “Save the rainforests” implies we aim to prevent any change at all. Similarly, the restoration of a habitat to its pre-European conditions suggests that we would have preferred that the ecosystem remained unchanged for 200 or 300 years.

Non-equilibrium ecology has also seriously challenged assumptions about equilibrium states (Neumann) and these ideas are being substituted with theories of sudden changes or punctuated equilibrium (Gould). These new ideas within the field of ecology further destabilize simplistic ideas about finding singular restoration endpoints because there is no stable equilibrium to which any system should return.

Recognizing that no scientifically defensible restoration endpoint exists, suddenly throws questions about restoration into the political realm. Science can still be used to weigh the advantages and disadvantages to different scenarios, but science will not reveal answers about what the ecosystem should look like in the future. Restoration science becomes descriptive, not normative. The normative decisions about what should be are devolved to the users and inhabitants of that ecosystem. No doubt this observation can be disturbing for ecologists since it places them in an unfamiliar position of not finding the “right” answer about what an ecosystem should look like. It may be even more troubling that the future of a place ecologists care about would be determined by the collective will of individuals that may include those who ‘do not care’ or at least have very different values with respect to an ecosystem’s future.

An openly political approach to identifying restoration endpoints dethrones the physical sciences, and elevates the social sciences. No doubt, historical ecology remains useful for informing decisions about restoration, but it is equally important to understand the environmental history of the site, since it is environmental history which explains how politics has shape resource use.

Environmental historians describe how landscape changes are the outcomes of historical struggles between competing resource users. Furthermore, the victors in these resource struggles often succeed in rewriting the ecological narrative of how a particular ecosystem operates or what has ‘always been’. This revisionist history gives existing resource users disproportionate power, especially if ecosystem managers rely on apolitical strategies to make restoration choices.

Environmental history can provide critical insight to help managers and the public make more informed decisions about what the ecosystems should look like in the future. For example, following the Mississippi floods of 1993, agricultural interests lobbied to rebuild levees and restore floodplain agricultural. In this context ‘restoration’ meant the farmers would re-appropriate agricultural rights on the floodplain. However a careful look into the environmental history of Mississippi River reveals that fishers had used the natural lakes along the floodplain long before levee agriculture. Furthermore, the fishing communities were violently removed from these lakes by agricultural interests who had stronger financial and political influences (Schneider). This case reveals how different restoration endpoints often are the reflection of political interests rather than an unbiased scientific truth. Other authors have similarly found that environmental narratives can dominate discourse and decisions about restoration. Cronon is well known for his description of wilderness in the American West and Spirn describes the competing narratives that argued for ‘restoring’ Olmstead’s Emerald Necklace in Boston, which was an a human constructed park built on narratives of its own. Given that particular stories about the past can dominate the public psyche, we should be suspect of assertions about restoration that claim to be objective or unbiased.

Adopting an apolitical or scientific approach for selecting restoration endpoints risks reinforcing existing patterns of resource use that probably benefit historical victors of resource struggle. Instead of relying on the scientific or apolitical approach, we should acknowledge that ecological restoration is fundamentally about human choices. Both natural science and social science should be used to inform our decisions. The inhabitants and neighbors of each site should decide what type of ecosystem they would like to co-exist with. Certainly, the science can help orient our decision making because some species probably will not survive in all climates. But fundamentally, it is a political decision.

Finally, understanding restoration as a political issue raises important questions about process and participation. This makes the work on participatory watershed management (Henne, Sabatier) even more critical for watershed managers, since the science alone will not reveal what watershed conditions should look like, rather these decisions should be the outcomes of democratic processes.

PhD Qualifying Exam: Area of Specialty (Question 5)

Researchers studying urban ecology have made the distinction between ecology in the city vs. ecology of the city. Do you consider this a useful distinction? In which of these areas would your proposed study fall?

Ecology is the study of biota and its biophysical environment. The field is young in comparison to its older sibling, Biology, which studies the behavior of species or cells. Ecology takes a step back to observe how species are interacting with each other and their habitat.

Ecology in Cities
In recent decades, a small group of rogue ecologists have chosen to practice ecology in urban environments. Roads, bridges, parking lots, abandoned mills, business districts and rail lines may sound like peculiar sites for ecological praxis. Yet these built environments have harnessed a devout following of urban ecologists, undeterred by rust, concrete, smog, or city sounds. These vanguard urban ecologists have generated a new sub-field in ecology that seeks to understand how species survive, behave, and reproduce in urban landscapes. They apply core principles from the natural sciences to study urban ecosystems and their practice can be understood as Ecology in Cities.

There are several good reasons why we need to understand species behavior in urban environments. In the summer, trees provide shade and reduce the heat island effect. They also are aesthetically pleasing, and if disease were to wipe them out, surly local residents would be upset about losing this amenity (and property values). Similarly, birds are great to hear in the morning, and squirrels are an entertaining feeding attraction.

The urban environment has also offered opportunities to test ecological theories. Landscape ecologists such as Forman and Mendelson have tested Wilson & MacAurthur’s theory of island biogeography. And the insight from landscape ecology provides practical guidance for urban ecosystem management. Urban ecologists have also observed how theories of adaptation and selection are reinforced. Pigeons are very successful urban species, and ecologists have found that they are related to bird species that previously inhabited cliffs. This partially explains why they have adapted well to cities, since tall buildings provide precisely the urban form/habitat they prefer.

Urban ecologists who practice Ecology in Cities are more likely to appreciate the impacts of humans on their study site, but there remains a degree of separation between the social and biophysical worlds. These urban ecologists still seek to understand the basic laws that govern urban species. Nature is still “out there” somewhere.

And yet the findings offered by this school of urban ecologists raises additional questions about the co-evolution of ecological and human species. In the pigeon example, human environments became the ideal habitat for a particular species. Humans in essence, helped the selection of pigeons over other bird species. Therefore in urban environments, and potentially elsewhere too, our ecological companions are products of human choices. If humans are the drivers of selection, then is it accurate to distinguish ecological systems from human systems? While not their intention, the urban ecologists that study Ecology in Cities
illustrated how species co-evolve with cities and human modified environments, and helped question the divide that they still respect.


Ecology of Cities
Social scientists from geography, environmental history and political ecology have blurred the nature vs human divide even further. Cronon deconstructed the concept of wilderness, and other geographers and political ecologists have followed suit by arguing that the no place on planet earth is unaffected by human influences. As such, “Nature is dead” (Castree).

This fusion of human and ecological systems into a singular unit of analysis gave birth to a form of Urban Ecology that studies the Ecology of Cities. Similar to how Ecology broke from Biology by broadening its scope of analysis, practitioners of Ecology of Cities took a step back even further by incorporating human systems as part of the socio-ecological environment. The city is studied as if were its own organism that consumes energy, materials, and water. The city has its own metabolism and excretes waste.

The Ecology of the City takes additional steps in breaking down the divisions between the human and biophysical environments by studying them in unison. This holistic approach is familiar to environmental historians. For example, in Grey Brechin’s historical account of urban growth in San Francisco he describes the flows of money, gold, and water that fed the growth of the City by the Bay. Even more eloquently, William Cronon observed how the agricultural and transportation pattern the Midwest, including the types of seed planted, was determined by the rise of Chicago.

The geographer Paul Robbins offers another example of Ecology of Cities in his study of the suburban lawn. Robbins boldly melds ecological and human systems by suggesting that the lawns themselves control human behavior. While his argument is counter-intuitive at first, he convincingly shows that the biological characteristics of turf grass, ie. the chemicals it needs and the cutting care it relies upon -- ultimately dictates how humans interact with the lawn and their neighborhood. The lawn calls out to be mowed. And people respond, dutifully mowing their lawns on weekends in the late Spring, precisely when the lawn wants to be trimmed.

Ecology in Cities & Ecology of Cities
The distinction between the Ecology in Cities and the Ecology of Cities is useful because it helps break down disciplinary barriers. It is a step toward integration and a movement away from reductionism. The Ecology of Cities adds intriguing complexity to our analysis of urban ecosystems and helps us see that biophysical systems are not independent from historical decisions, human choices or cultural perceptions.

Appreciating this distinction is especially important in an era of interdisciplinarity and sustainability. Everywhere there are calls for improved integration across fields. There is strong impulse to generate new understanding by overlapping and combining knowledge from different arenas. There is a pressure to be more integrative and holistic.

This call for integration and appreciation of the integral role of humans in ecosystems has been well received by some conservation biologists (Armsworth et al. 2007). They are starting to recognize that it is time to include humans into their analysis of ecosystems. For too long conservation biology has focused narrowly on their favorite species or ecosystem and only referred to humans in passing, or as the source of destruction. Armsworth et al (2007) suggested that conservation biologists incorporate humans into the ecosystem, and therefore make the move from Ecology in Cities to Ecology of Cities.

And while most agree that the synthesis proposed by practitioners of Ecology of Cities is valuable, I am humbled by the implications of this daunting task. Meaningful integration of human and biophysical systems is an enormous undertaking. The assumption is that it will provide more clarity into the phenomenon observed. However more clarity is not guaranteed. While I agree that this integration is useful and necessary, I am wary of how it will materialize.

To appreciate the complexity implicit with this integration, we can look to the difficulties ecologists have encountered when combining physical and ecological models. These difficulties persist despite the rigidity of the physical laws and relationships more common in the physical sciences.

Carl Walters from the University of British Columbia has studied ecological modeling and adaptive management in coastal and river ecosystems and he provides an excellent review of the difficulties associated with modeling the biophysical world. He points out that river manager’s need four types of models to understand river systems: a geomorphologic model, a hydrological model, a physical-chemical model for water quality, and an ecological model. Each model operates different time and spatial scales, with different resolutions, units of analysis and degrees of uncertainty. Adding new parameters often leads to compounding errors multiplicatively, and therefore decreasing the utility of the model. Thus Walters is skeptical that these models can be meaningfully integrated without field experimentation. He warns that researchers trust their models too much, and they are over ambitious in what they think they can achieve. Walters laments that for every complex relationship that is nearly impossible to explain, there is a researcher who will claim the capacity to model the relationship if only granted enough money. Walter’s observations about the difficulty in combining different biophysical models is useful warning for interdisciplinary graduate students who may underestimate the difficulty in integrating knowledges from the biophysical world with the social sciences.

Where does my research fall?
I will draw from the knowledge generated by both types of Urban Ecologists, but the direction I will pursue follows the spirit of those who study the Ecology of the City. My dissertation will have at least two components. I expect to begin with an environmental history of salt pollution in the Llobregat River. Similar to Cronon, Brechin and White, this segment will follow the tradition of urban ecologists concerned with the ecology of the city. The environmental history will trace the evolution of potassium mining, pollution and the urban settlements near the Llobregat side by side. I seek to uncover how people shaped the river, but also how the river shaped human choices and perceptions in the past and today.

Following the environmental history, my dissertation will study how the management of ecosystem services may help river and water treatment managers seeking to remediate river pollution. The particular circumstances in the Llobregat River, whereby salt pollution in the river increases water treatment costs, provide a convenient link between the biophysical and human systems. This part of my research will reflect more similarities to the research of Ecology of Cities since it bridges both human and ecological systems.

Research concerning ecosystem services seeks to break down barriers between social and biophysical sciences and to make the connections between these systems more explicit. In this sense, research on ecosystem services is consistent with the Ecology of Cities approach. And yet, the field of ecosystem services has chosen to push together the human and ecological systems very close, but refused to mesh them together entirely. After all, most researchers in ecosystem services were trained in the biological of physical sciences. These researchers are grounded in a distinct philosophical and epistemological tradition that makes it very difficult for them to accept all of the claims made by political ecologists who advance the study of urban systems as one single system. Furthermore, the methods and tools used in ecosystem service science resemble those from their peers, traditional Ecologists, who study Ecology in Cities.

Therefore researchers in ecosystem services resist wiping away all distinctions between natural and human worlds as some political ecologists have proposed. Researchers in ecosystems services are unlikely to give non-human things agency, nor are they likely to believe that “Nature is Dead”. In many respects they are holding on to the differences between the two fields. Researchers of ecosystem services are therefore an interesting amalgam of both urban ecololgists, that drawn on the tools from Ecology in the City, yet seek to advance the cause of those who subscribe to studying Ecology of the City.

In sum, the distinction between Ecology in Cities and Ecology of Cities is useful because it shows different levels of integration between human and ecological systems. Placing my work on environmental history and ecosystem services within this continuum clarifies how I will contribute to Urban Ecology. It shows that while my tendency is to advance the integration proposed by study of Ecology of Cities, there are still limits to this integration. These limits to integration are driven by both technical challenges in creating meaningful understandings that cross disciplinary boundaries, as well as by philosophical and epistemological beliefs about how to conduct research, and the extent to which the biophysical world is a human construct.

PhD Qualifying Exam: Methods (Question 4)

What insights can economic analysis of alternate environmental management policies (regulatory, incentive-based, and voluntary) provide for the watershed planning process?

Economic analysis of alternative environmental policies is designed to facilitate decision making for improved social welfare. A watershed planning process, similar to other areas of public decision-making, can draw from economic theory to identify appropriate courses of action. While the ultimate goal of economic analysis is to improve social welfare, there are specific contexts in which economic analysis is particularly useful.

To reallocate resources for efficiency improvements
Economic analysis helps identify inefficient resource use, and potentially can propose different allocations to improve total social welfare. Improved allocation of resources is essential in order to meet human needs and wants. Furthermore, the scarcity of our global resources, which can be contrasted with growth in human populations, makes efficiency essential to maintain or improve human welfare. As mentioned earlier, a driving principle in economics is the ideal of Pareto Optimality whereby we seek to improve the welfare of at least some individuals without decreasing the welfare of others. Frequently this is obtained through the exchange of goods and services that exploit our different individual preferences in order to create transactions that benefit all parties involved.

Many environmental problems are concrete manifestations of inefficient resource allocations. Economics can clarify that the pollution generates undesirable costs that should be averted so that resources can be used elsewhere. Therefore when a lake is polluted, or drinking water supplies are contaminated, economic arguments in favor of environmental remediation are not merely acts of kindness, but rather driven by arguments against the inefficiency of pollution.

In some circles, especially in the realm of critical theory, efficiency has been criticized for obtaining dogma status or for trampling on concerns of equity, rights, or diversity (Scott, Rawls, Young). While the goal of efficiency does not justify ignoring other social issues, neither should we dismiss efficiency improvements as a worthwhile social goal.

To establish appropriate rules of exchange
Economic analysis can help assess how different norms of exchange, rules, or institutional frameworks may yield different outcomes. Existing resource allocations (land, capital) as well as the existing institutions that govern resource exchange (regulatory, incentive-based, and voluntary) are the products of historical struggle (Costanza, Ostrom, Schneider). Often, the arrangements we have inherited are deemed inappropriate on either efficiency or equity grounds. In these cases, economic analysis is essential for evaluating the impacts of various institutional arrangements that contextualize production and distribution.

In a watershed planning process, there is usually considerable debate about what the rules of engagement should be. Under which circumstances should society give private firms the right to pollute? How should pollution be managed? How should public agencies intervene? And what are the rights of pollution victims? These are not easy questions to answer since society must live with some degree of resource use and pollution. Few would argue for a zero pollution society since that would imply a rejection of all technology and contemporary goods. However if we accept some level of resource use and pollution, the question then becomes, how much? What is the appropriate level of pollution? To answer these questions, we must: (a) understand social preferences and (b) then establish appropriate rules of exchange, norms, or institutions, in order to bring us closer to our social preferences.

Therefore, economic analysis can help establish the appropriate rules of engagement between actors in a watershed, and can estimate the different outcomes that are likely to occur under different scenarios (regulatory, incentive-based, and voluntary). When existing norms of engagement are inappropriate, economic analysis can provide institutional innovation to devise new rules that may lead to better outcomes. In recent years, economists have been exploring institutional arrangements that combine command-and-control policies with incentive-based mechanisms. For example, the cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions, involves a command-and-control cap, followed by a trading system among polluters in order to maximize pollution reduction at the lowest possible cost. This is an example of the institutional innovation generated by economists that can be useful for improving social welfare.

To compare of alternative courses of action
Ideas are always competing for attention and the chance to be implemented. In the face of this competition, any decision making processes must be able to evaluate the competing alternatives in order to make sound choices. Economics provides analytical tools, both conceptual and quantitative, that facilitate this comparison of alternatives.

When evaluating alternative courses of action, it is useful to have a common unit or metric for comparison. The field of economics proposes that we evaluate alternatives based on the social utility generated from each option. This social utility is quantified and monetized into a common unit of exchange. While this process of monetization is controversial, it still provides a starting point for assessment.

Most choices involve trade-offs. If we want recreation areas for hikes and picnics, we may need to forgo urban development for low income housing. If we want clean water supplies free of carcinogenic compounds, we may need to contribute additional greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Economic analysis clarifies these tradeoffs. It helps us balance competing demands and helps us chose the policies that most closely approximate social preferences.

Cost-benefit analysis is one way to weigh these competing interests. When costs and benefits are distributed unevenly throughout society, economic analysis can help identify the winners and losers, and potentially quantify the magnitude of these gains and losses. This information, while always incomplete, is essential information for making decisions about alternatives.

Economic analysis can also help uncover new alternatives that watershed managers did not consider at the outset. I hope this is the case with my own dissertation whereby conducting an analysis on the watershed scale and by integrating economic knowledge with our understanding of ecosystems, I will be able to identify new courses of action that can improve environmental quality and reduce water treatment costs.

Finally, economic analysis can help us avoid making costly mistakes. It has been asserted that decision making without analysis can lead to systematic bias and error (Costanza). Errors can be costly, either to us directly or for future generations. Incorrect valuations or expectations about the future may constrain future choices, or limit the resources available to us tomorrow. Economic analysis helps us study these future scenarios, although this sort of analysis is by no means exclusive to the realm of economics.

Thus economics provides a common language in which to evaluate alternatives. And while this common language is not perfect, it is a starting point upon which to make systematic evaluations of proposed strategies for moving forward.

Methods for estimating social preferences
Economics also provides methods to ascertain social preferences. In watershed planning processes, these methods are especially useful since many of the goods and services related to watershed planning are not valued by markets. In these cases, economics offers methods for estimating how society values these goods and services. Common methods in environmental economics include: hedonic valuations, that decompose the value of marketed goods into various components in order to extract the additional value of a non-marketed good; contingent valuation studies that directly inquire into individuals willingness to pay for a non-marketed good or service, and travel cost studies, which measure the expenses travelers pay to visit areas of biological value or natural beauty in order to ascertain how much they value these sites.

Here I have described only four ways in which economic analysis contributes to watershed planning. Yet all of these insights from economics: (1) the improvement of resource allocation for efficiency; (2) the establishment of appropriate rules of engagement; (3) comparing alternative courses of action; and (4) methods for estimating social preferences; are designed to improve decision making and social welfare. These contributions, while limited in many respects, nevertheless can help clarify the complex and competing demands associated with watershed management.

PhD Qualifying Exam: Methods (Question 3)

Discuss the major challenges and opportunities in commodifying ecosystem services for watershed management.

Ecosystem services are the goods and services that ecosystems provide humans. They are valuable because we depend on them to survive (Daily 1997, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Ecosystems produce the food we eat, purify our air and water, and regulate our climate. Ecosystem services are the basic life support systems for all human activity. Yet while their value has been widely recognized, these values have not been incorporated into decision making. The result has been widespread deterioration of these ecosystems, which threatens their capacity to meet our needs in the short run and threatens human survival in the long run (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).

What explains this contradiction? How can ecosystem services be essential for human survival and yet at the same time be constantly degraded? Many scholars believe that ecosystem services continue to deteriorate because they have been inappropriately valued, or commodified, by the public and private institutions that manage them. Without appropriate valuation, the contributions made by ecosystem services are not included in the decisions that accelerate their deterioration.

It follows then, that the appropriate valuation of ecosystem services can make huge strides in improving ecosystem management. New York City’s water supply is the most heralded example of how our understanding of the watershed dynamics allowed water managers to invest in an upstream protection scheme instead of building a filtration plant. This huge success has been widely celebrated as a successful adoption of ecosystem valuation that saved New York City billions of dollars (Heal, NRC).

Incorporating ecosystem services into an economic framework has many of the advantages that one might expect. It can improve resource efficiency, clarify tradeoffs, promote intergenerational equity, and ensure economic and ecologic sustainability of human and biological systems. In short, assessing and valuing ecosystem services is an essential step toward sustainability (Daily, Matson, Chan, Ricketts, Kareiva). This proposition is not entirely new, since early ecological economists such as Robert Costanza and Herman Daly, have supported the integration of economic and ecological systems for many years, and only now this approach has become widely accepted and mainstream.

There are clear opportunities associated with integrating ecosystem services into management decisions and yet considerable challenges remain. These challenges emerge from different disciplines and fields. First I will address two points of view who question the commodification process, either because they question anthropocentrism or because they question the underlying logic of market capitalism. Then I will proceed to discuss the challenges associated with valuing ecosystem services even when one accepts, at least temporarily, an anthropocentrist and capitalistic frame of reference. But first, a few thoughts on commodification and valuation.

Valuation has become a contested issue (Goulder and Kennedy 1997). It is important to clarify that economists only claim to measure economic values, and do not make claims on spiritual or moral values. These other values could be in addition to economic values, not replace them. Confusion on the scope of economic valuation has led to considerable confusion and virulent attacks against economists (NRC 2005).

I understand commodification to be a particular form of valuation that results in commercial values. I would argue that not all valuations imply commodification because many non-market valuations do not expect a commercial transaction to occur.

Commodification implies the transformation of a good so that it can be exchanged with another good of equal value. In short, it becomes substitutable. If a good is substitutable, this feature permits individuals to trade in order to improve individual utility or generate additional value. William Cronon has eloquently described the commodification of grain markets in Chicago. In his account, the commodification of grain was an essential institutional innovation that permitted the development of trade and commerce in the American West. Without commodification, farmers were attached to the precise kernels that came from their field. However when farmers could exchange grain-vouchers instead of grain, their product was commodified and could be rapidly traded between individuals or across continents without moving a single sack of wheat. This generated huge flexibility and wealth. Farmers could use grain vouchers to buy other goods such as land, or use the grain markets like a bank where they could trade their vouchers for gold when needed. This process depended merely on accepting that owning grain was not restricted to a particular physical entity, but rather to rights on a grain of the same quality.

In some ways, ecosystem service research is seeking to make equivalent efficiency improvements as those observed in the nineteenth century grain markets. However the commodification of ecosystem services, and the implication of substutibility remains controversial, especially those who hold a biocentrist view. Acknowledging the substitution of a good, such as an ecosystem service, may unnerve those who wish to protect it based on its intrinsic value. If one believes that certain things should have value even if no human believes so, then this position subscribes to biocentrism. This biocentrist position is difficult to reconcile with the anthropocentric field of economics. They would object to commodification of ecosystem services as an undervaluation of the true value of the ecosystems. Some biocentrists claim that priceless goods should not be valued at all because the process of valuation inherently de-values its infinite worth. Economists counter by asserting that not assigning any value permits a valuation in practice of zero.

To commodify assumes an anthropocentric framework, where all values are referenced to human preferences. However an anthropocentric view of economics approach can account for intrinsic values through the concept of existence values (NRC 2005). Existence value is the value that individuals derive from knowing that a particular species or place exists, even if they never obtain any instrumental benefits this environmental good (they never visit or see the species). Therefore the anthropocentric view has incorporated some flexibility to incorporate the values of those who care about the preservation of ecosystems even if they have not immediate instrumental value.

Anyone who questions the underlying logic of market capitalism is also likely to have problems with the commodification of ecosystem services. For many, including Marxists-environmentalists (Castree), the underlying logic of economic is seen as the culprit that is driving ecological deterioration. Therefore, it seems counterintuitive that more economic thinking can pull us out of ecological catastrophe. This position holds that what is needed is less economic commodification, not more (McCauley 2006).

In addition to these broader criticisms on the commodification of ecosystem services, there are still challenges for those who accept anthropocentrism and market capitalism. I will discuss only three additional challenges (a) scalar mismatch (b) dynamic systems and nonlinearity, and (c) permanence.

Scalar mismatch
Another central challenge to ecosystem service valuation is scalar mismatch. Ecosystem services operate at time and spatial scales that far exceed the scope of the institutions we have created to manage them (Costanza, Ostrom). This scalar mismatch crosses both time and space. It has been recognized that all valuations are contingent upon the scalar assumptions, and that useful valuation cannot be made without specifiying the time and spatial scales adopted (NRC 2005). Scalar mismatch also leads to problems of aggregation, as evident in the controversial piece Costanza et al. (1997), in which they multiplied average ecosystem values per hectare by total global hectares. It then ambitiously summed up the value of all ecosystems across the globe. This simplistic approach of multiplication and addition implied that ecosystems had uniform value across time and space. However we know that ecosystems are dynamic and nonlinear.

Dynamic Systems and Nonlinearity
The dynamic and nonlinear feature of ecosystems defies attempts at commodification and valuation. Ecosystem service provision has dynamic variations over seasons, elevations, or latitudes. Furthermore there are thresholds upon which certain ecosystems obtain or lose value. For example, a large wetland may metabolize wastewater from a small town and allow city managers to avoid investing in a wastewater treatment plant. However reduction in the wetland size may suddenly disrupt the capacity of the wetland to provide its service. Or, the same wetland in another town that already has a wastewater treatment plant would not ascribe the same value to the same wetland.

Koch et al. (2009) described how coastal vegetation provided nonlinear protection of coastal property that depended on tidal and seasonal fluctuations as well as geographic location. There was no doubt that the presence of the marine vegetation reduced wave impact on shore, and could mitigate the property damage produced by large storms. However the provision of this service fluctuated tremendously over time and space. Tidal fluctuations overlapped with seasonal changes and movements in ocean currents to provide nonlinear service provision. Even the same species with similar densities would offer less protection at lower latitudes that similar ecosystem in northern latitudes. This example exemplifies the over-simplification made in Costanza’s piece, since it is inaccurate to assume constant service provision over time and space. It also provides insight into the difficulties in valuing services that have so much fluctuation.

Permanence
Valuations have been criticized because they are embedded in social systems and markets that are volatile, and therefore cannot offer permanent protection. There is a fear that if we justify conservation based on economic reasons alone, this protection may not survive in the long run because of the whims of the markets. As we have seen with the current financial crises, changes in expectations can evaporate wealth. If conservation is based on economic values instead of moral values, it becomes vulnerable to sudden changes in the marketplace that can invert outcomes.

For example, in Costa Rica coffee producers depend on pollination services from nearby forest ecosystems. It has been shown that proximity to forests increases the economic output of coffee producing plantations as a result of pollination services. This justified additional forest protection. But then the market changed. Coffee prices dropped and pineapples were planted instead of coffee. The pineapples did not rely on pollination services, therefore the economic logic would then strip the forest of its value that justified protection, and potentially, the economic logic may recommend cutting the forests for its commercial value as timber (McCauley 2006). Therefore the commodification strategy associated with ecosystems services suffers from a lack of permanence because it is inherently embedded in social systems and perceptions which may change.

Those who criticize the commodification of ecosystem services raise valid questions. I agree that there are times when we must confront real tradeoffs between ecosystem protection and human needs. Ecosystems are not always benevolent nor will they always align themselves with human interests. We should not delude ourselves into believing that this compatibility is universal or constant. But at the same time, there are still many circumstances in which this compatibility has not been realized. Low hanging fruit awaits discovery, and I hypothesize that our disciplinary blinders has prevented us from uncovering them.

Furthermore, to exploit the benefits of ecosystem services it is not necessary to resolve all the controversial issues raised with valuation. Instead of investing resources into improving our valuation methods, some have suggested that valuation be sidestepped completely by instead focusing on cost-effectiveness of particular policy goals (Power et al.). In this way one can concentrate on cost-effective approaches with tangible benefits associated with particular outcomes. It is likely that my dissertation will follow this route, where I will use the ecosystem services framework to uncover new watershed management approaches with tangible benefits without having to answer all the questions regarding valuation and commodification.

PhD Qualifying Exam: Planning Theory (Question 2)

In the context of conflicting interests of the upstream and downstream user, discuss how theories and understandings of justice may inform distinct set of interventions and distinct outcomes for planners involved in watershed management.

To discuss the relevance of understanding justice for planning outcome sought you may choose two or three of the theoretical frameworks suggested below, or choose others as you see fit: Justice as freedom to achieve optimum capabilities (Amartya Sen); Justice as recognition of difference (Iris Young), justice as fairness (John Rawls).


Conflicts over natural resources can originate from different understandings about justice. Similarly, conflicts related to watershed management and water pollution are also grounded in different theories of justice since different water users or polluters make competing claims about their rights to use or abuse water resources. When these competing claims are brought forward to public officials, they often must decide how to weigh these competing claims. At this point it becomes critical for public official to understand the different conceptualizations of justice and their philosophical origins. More broadly, local users and researchers should also understand the competing definitions of justice in order to provide more clarity in their analysis.

Claims about justice are inseparable from the philosophical and moral code that guides decision-making. We all cling to various ethical frameworks whether we recognize them or not. Sometimes we even hold on to clashing ethical frameworks simultaneously. However it is the responsibility of the public official, planner, or watershed manager, to understand these competing ethical frameworks, each with its own conception of justice, in order to make reasoned decisions. Understanding these ethical frameworks will help us weigh competing arguments, accurately communicate different positions, and potentially uncover new positions that have failed to surface.

Since conceptions of justice emerge from various theoretical and philosophical frameworks, and since a theory of justice cannot be isolated from its philosophical origin, I will discuss three conceptions of justice offered by three major philosophical currents: utilitarianism, rights-based justice, and Rawlsian justice. First I describe the conception of justice held by each philosophical position and then proceed to describe the recommendations they would make in cases of watershed conflicts. I conclude with some final remarks.

Utilitarian conception of Justice
Under a utilitarian conception of justice, interventions are deemed permissible if they increase aggregate social value. By default, interventions that decrease social value are deemed morally impermissible. Economic analysis is largely grounded in the utilitarian philosophical framework. Pure utilitarian logic is difficult to defend and therefore a degree of flexibility has been incorporated. The well known decision rule of Pareto Optimality - whereby everyone must be made better off without making anyone worse off - encapsulates a modified yet mainstream utilitarian position. At times, economists have been accused of being insensitive to distributional issues, and therefore insensitive to issues of justice. However this interpretation is not entirely accurate since Pareto Optimality explicitly posits that no individual should be made worse off. Beyond not making anyone worse off, the Pareto Optimality decision rule provides no guidance as to how resources should be distributed, as long as resources are used efficiently.

However in practice, most interventions have winners and losers. This makes Pareto Optimality is difficult to obtain without additional intervention. In response, many utilitarians will accept potentially Pareto Optimal decisions as long as the losers are compensated, and the end result is that no one is made worse off.

Therefore a utilitarian conception of justice would seek to ensure that those damaged by resource use in the watershed were appropriately compensated. Compensation becomes the primary avenue for addressing injustice. In this framework, where injustice is defined as a breach in the rules of Pareto Optimality, justice is generated by accurately measuring the costs and benefits of economic activity or policy interventions.

A utilitarian conception of justice would lead watershed managers to engage in prolific measurement and quantification of welfare and utility. Utility in turn, can be monetized which permits precise compensation for lost welfare. In this conception of justice, there is a precise numeric solution to the distribution of resources that can lead to a just society, or that can determine when a policy becomes just or unjust. In short, issues of justice become technical questions that can be resolved by more precise measurement or more appropriate distribution (compensation).

However even those who ascribe to this position would recognize that there are limitations to this conception, such as our capacity for measurement, uncertainty about the precision of our measurements, and as well as problems of comparability and commensurability.

Rights based conception of Justice
A rights based approach considers decisions or actions to be just when essential rights are not violated. This conception breaks from the utilitarian framework and resolves some of the awkward decisions generated by pure utilitarianism. For example, if the production of a particular good in a watershed leads to tremendous income, wealth and prosperity for 100,000 but at the expense of intoxicating 2 downstream users to death, then this would clearly violate the essential rights of two individuals and be deemed unjust. Depending on the value ascribed to life, or the value of a statistical life (VSL), utilitarians could accept this outcome.

Environmentalists often rely on a rights based theory of justice when they argue that the right to life, health, beauty, or ecological integrity should take precedence over economic activity. When an economic or scientific analysis does not sway the opinion of an environmentalist, it is likely that they are holding on to a rights based conception of justice. In some cases, the rights based position extends rights to the non-human world, and therefore they take a non-anthropocentric ethical framework that includes rights to animals, plants and even the physical world. This conception of justice has been advanced by philosophers such as Peter Singer and planners such as Timothy Beatly. Their conception of justice would include the aquatic species living in the river, as well as the terrestrial ecosystems.

Using a rights based approach to watershed conflict would first establish everyone’s basic rights and ensure that those were met. However a challenge arises when these rights themselves come into conflict. How do we balance the right to clean drinking water with the right to the preservation of a beautiful valley? The controversy surrounding the construction of Hetch Hetchy Dam in California confronted this precise question.

Legislation tries to protect basic rights pertaining to public health and safety. Often, these rights are enforced by creating minimum public health standards for drinking water supplies. For example, in the Llobregat watershed, the disinfection process for treating drinking water generates disinfection by-products which are known carcinogens. These carcinogens are distributed in the drinking supply. Since utilities knowingly intoxicate drinking water users, one could claim that the right to clean water has been violated. But what does “clean water” really mean? Everywhere we are surrounded by contaminants, and by default we live with certain levels of pollution. At which level of contamination do the rights of drinking water users become violated? Should one permit carcinogenic byproducts at 1 part per million (ppm)? 10 ppm? 100 ppm? There are no clear guidelines, and ultimately a decision must be made at some threshold. It is at this point where the economic analysis/framework provides some guidance, if nothing less, for an approximation. A world that holds to all rights, simultaneously, seems difficult to defend, and much more difficult to implement in practice.

In the Llobregat watershed, the rights based conceptualization would also need to balance the rights of workers who benefit from the polluting industry, with the rights of downstream users. While the rights based conception of justice is attractive and useful, philosophers have been struggling to organize these rights into a consistent framework for decision making. Perhaps the philosopher that made the most progress in this regard has been John Rawls.

Rawlsian conception of Justice
John Rawls rejected a utilitarian conception of justice, and fits himself squarely under a rights based conceptualization of justice. One of his central contributions was finding an innovative method for reconciling the conflicting needs of various rights, especially between liberty and equality. In his seminal work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls outlines the features of his philosophical framework, and makes suggestions about how to prioritize and balance competing rights.

According to Rawlsian justice, decisions or actions are just if they improve the welfare of the worst off. Rawls arrives to this conclusion through his “veil of ignorance” metaphor. He argues that if, a priori, we did not know our material conditions in the real world, we would chose to make an equitable and just distribution of resources. The decisions we would make under the ‘veil of ignorance’ would lead us to a just world. In these circumstances, liberty would be highly prized since behind the veil of ignorance, no one would wish to be a slave. Rawls prizes liberty, and asserts that liberty should not be violated except in few circumstances. The central exception to our right to liberty is under circumstances where it benefits the least favored. As a result, Rawlsian justice focuses on improving the welfare of the worst off.

An application of Rawlsian justice in watershed management would entail identifying and improving the welfare of the least well off. One can assume that the least well off is measured in economic terms, although there are probably other metrics upon which we can determine well-being. The stakeholders in the Llobregat include the mining company, the water treatment utilities, the mining communities, river communities along the Llobregat and water consumers. This approach would entail qualitative methods and historical analysis since determining the “worst off” is historically and culturally contextual. In economic terms, one might find that communities in the mining town to be the worst off, and their economic condition would deteriorate further if the mine company were to shut down (and pollution stopped). But the process of defining stakeholders, it becomes clear that there is some level discretion.

In sum, different conceptualizations of justice lead to different approaches to watershed management. Being able to understand these differences, their origins and implications, will prepare watershed managers to balance competing claims about what is deemed to be the ethically appropriate decision.

PhD Qualifying Exam: Planning Theory (Question 1)

Imagine past and contemporary planning theorists subscribing to different epistemological traditions have somehow gathered in one room to discuss your research project titled: “Watershed Management and River Restoration in the Context of Conflicting Upstream and Downstream Interests.”

a) Choose your favorite theorist(s) within the following traditions:
• Rational scientific planning;
• Coherentist planning
• Postmodern planning
• Collaborative planning

b) Outline how each theorist will advise you on guiding principles of your planning intervention; and
c) Discuss the strengths and limitations of each perspective in dealing with the context of your project.

This week I was fortunate to discuss my research with planning theorists who ascribe to contrasting schools of thought. From each of them, I have obtained valuable lessons and strategies for framing my research. Below I describe what they told me, as well as the strengths and limitations to their approach as it pertains to my work on watershed management.

Rational scientific planning
The rational and scientific planners (Simon, Davidoff, Faludi, Wildavsky) got straight to the point. They advised me to begin with a comprehensive watershed diagnostic. I should begin by collect biophysical data (elevation, vegetation, urbanization, hydrology, soil type, sewer systems, flow trends, water quality etc...) in addition to social data (water users, income, willingness to pay) and integrate this into a singular watershed model. The advances in geographic information system (GIS) software would facilitate the integration of the data layers into a singular electronic model. Once the diagnostic was completed, the main problems in the watershed such as pollution or inefficiencies would reveal themselves.

Having generated a diagnostic watershed model, the rational and scientific decision maker would then proceed with the following steps:
1) Identify watershed goals
2) Establish priorities and criteria to evaluate interventions
3) Identify all possible watershed interventions
4) Evaluate alternatives according to priorities and criteria
5) Select the best policy
6) Implement

The advantage to this decision making process is that it is linear and straightforward. There is also accountability for why decisions have been made. In terms of accountability, it is democratic, even though the decisions are often centralized. And while some of the planners recognized some weaknesses to this approach, they insisted that it was necessary because there is so much about the watershed that we still did not understand: Which pollutants flow through the watershed? How to these pollutants interact with the ecosystems? What is the cost of treating these pollutants? How do these pollutants vary over space and time? And they pointed out that no one had yet studied the ecosystem service provision in the watershed. In this sense, they encouraged me to explore the spatial and temporal variability of the ecosystem services provided in the watershed.

I quickly determined that the comprehensive watershed planning approach would not be entirely appropriate for my research. Even if I adopted Herbert Simon’s ‘bounded rationality’, that permitted screening of alternatives and sufficing with the most realistic options, the complexity of the watershed still far exceeded my capacity of comprehension. There are the standard criticisms to the rational choice model, such as the lack of comparability between alternatives, and the difficulty in quantifying particular values. But even beyond that, I was concerned that their approach did not encourage me to look at the historical and political context of water pollution. It seems that there is a wealth of information and insight to be uncovered by looking into the past and by understanding how the watershed has evolved over time.

The rational planners recommended that I rely predominately on quantitative methods. While many of these are useful, I found that most quantitative methods suggested would not uncover the multidimensionality and complexity of the watershed problems at hand.

Coherentist planning
Donaghy and Hopkins (2006) suggested that I take a coherentist approach to planning. They told me that creating a singular and hierarchical master plan for the watershed was neither possible nor advisable. This singular comprehensive plan would be an artificial construct in the sense that it would smother dissent among various actors in the watershed. By glossing over dissent, I would lose out on valuable insight that can be generated by exploring the tensions. From a theoretical perspective, they explained that a coherentist approach to planning theory follows the same logic as the theory about maintain a ‘web of plans’. Just how a ‘web of plans’ is preferable to a Master plan, so too is it preferable to maintain contextual theories that co-exist despite their contradictions. Therefore in planning theory, it is critical to look for and rely upon a repertoire of planning theories to assist us is deriving theories of explanations and theories of justifications. While we all need theories (explanations and justifications) to help us cope with the complexity of the world, these theories should be contingent on context. Researchers should ask about the historical and political of theory making, as well as ask which audience will consume or evaluate the theory. Donaghy and Hopkins suggested that I begin by analyzing my audience since the audience is likely to determine the causal depth necessary to validate the explanation I may give. We agreed that my audience consists of both public officials and water treatment engineers, and that this group is more likely to be amenable to models of how the watershed works. In this case, they encouraged me to work with researchers who have experience on quantitative modeling of pollution, while at the same time, explore other questions using other methods that can complement my quantitative findings.

Donaghy and Hopkins were supportive of my idea to conduct an environmental history of water pollution in the watershed. They agreed that this analysis could reveal insights that could elude my analysis of water quality and treatment costs. They also encouraged me to identify discrepancies and inconsistencies among the methods I used, because they hypothesized that it was at these points of friction, on the edges between disciplines, where advances could be made. They also warned me of dogmatisms, and encouraged me to not presume disagreement between theories.

The advantage of the coherentist approach is that it provides me with epistemological flexibility, and provides me with a broader range of methods and strategies to address my research question. The disadvantage to their approach is that it remains unclear how to select particular approaches in different circumstances.

Postmodern planning
The postmodernists were a fun crowd (Foucault, Milroy, Beauregard, Sandercock). They reveled in questioning every assumption I had made in my proposal. They reminded me that knowledge is a social construct, not the product of objective rationalization. To prove their point, they relied on the work of linguists (Saussucre) who showed that meaning is ultimately subject to our interpretation of arbitrary signifiers. By understanding the separation of signifier and signified, we realize that our words are arbitrary combinations of symbols that have meaning only in their social context. By changing or removing the social context, we can change or remove meaning. As a result all knowledge is socially constructed, and in constant evolution. ‘Truth’ becomes redefined as that which is no longer contested in a particular social context.

The postmodernists had plenty of suggestions that were relevant to my work. First, they suggested that searching for a singular and optimal solution to water pollution was fruitless. And even if a singular solution could be calculated, they warned me that the result was contingent upon our positionality and assumptions. To this I replied that economists already knew that assumptions were critical for determining outcomes! The postmodernists clarified, saying that they were referring to assumptions about which questions were important to ask in the first place. In this respect, they advised me to concentrate on problem framing instead of problem solving.

Milroy (2001) was able to summarize four basic tenants of post-modernism thought. First, it was deconstructive, in the sense that I described earlier. Second, it was anti-foundational, meaning that they rejected universal laws, truth and reason. Third, it was non-dualistic in the sense that they discouraged traditional dichotomies that frame our understanding: good vs. bad; men vs. women; fact vs. values. And fourth, they embraced diversity.

I felt I could accept most, but not all of Milroy’s tenants of postmodernity. The tenant that caused me most concern was anti-foundationalism since it rejected all universal laws and truth. Accepting such a tenant would put me a serious bind, and challenge my ability to make recommendations. Accepting anti-foundationalism risked throwing me off the precipice of relativism where no truth exists, no assertion becomes more valid than another, and no action is possible. In short, everything goes.

Still, it was useful speaking to the postmodern planners because they encouraged me to think about power relationships. They also encouraged me to deconstruct the existing narratives that dominate explanations about water pollution. One dominant narrative is that the pollution emanating from the mine is too expensive to clean up and that the costs for addressing the problem far exceed the potential benefits. Furthermore, the narrative asserts that local mining towns depend on employment from the operation of the mines, and that closing the mines would provoke widespread economic devastation.

The postmodernists helped me construct a counter-narrative that described how mining towns have already organized to enforce environmental regulations on the mining industry. The mines have already generated economic devastation for other industries including local water suppliers that need to ship in new water from miles away because their local source has been salinated. Profits from the mines are exported to a foreign mining conglomerate in the Middle East, and miners are willing to change employment if other opportunities existed. Lastly, the ‘costs’ of addressing the pollution problem may in fact generate returns on investment (profits) downstream, and finally, the operation of the mine may be compatible with ecosystem recovery.


Collaborative planning
The collaborative planners (Forrester, Healey, Innes and Susskind) were congenial and great listeners. They encouraged me to play close attention what was being said about the watershed, and then to participate in this dialogue. For these collaborative planners, knowledge was constructed through communication acts. They drew from Habermas and his conception of communicative rationality -- which is essentially an epistemological view that knowledge is created through communication (Sandercock 1998). This concept made intuitive sense to me, and also offered a concrete strategy for moving forward in a postmodern world where knowledge and truth may be social constructs.

When we engage in dialogue, we bring with us our personal views of how the world works. Our cultural background shapes our perception of facts and theories in unique ways. These perceptual differences can account for much of the disagreements about watershed policies. Therefore the collaborative planners agreed with the postmodernists in the sense that knowledge is a social construct. But they diverged by pointing out that knowledge could be generated through productive dialogue. Despite our difference when we come to the table, if we listen, communicate and share points of view, then as a group we can create a new consensus, and ultimately, new knowledge, and a new truth. This epistemological view of how knowledge is generated and validated offers considerable insight. It suggests that deliberation by itself can generate knowledge, without adherence to any particular to a particular scientific method. Conversely, knowledge generated under the scientific epistemology may not be sufficient for social validity but that those findings should be inserted into the process of dialogue for validation. Ultimately, peers and contemporaries will determine the value of my work. My findings do not live in a social vacuum, and therefore if I seek relevance, it must be a part of the broader discussion.

The collaborative planners encouraged me to speak and listen carefully to the stakeholders in the watershed. They advised me to be aware of gender differences, class differences and social position, since each would probably influence local perceptions. They asked me: Who do you listen to? Who are you willing to learn from?
It was great to talk to Judith Innes who has practical experience implementing dialogue processes in California watersheds.

Some collaborative planners recommended that I hold a visioning process for the watershed that could bring the stakeholders together to discuss their conflicting views and priorities. Others suggested that instead of relying of GIS models to identify the ecosystem services, that I simply interview local residents and ask them what services they have identified.

While I was very interested in their approach, I pointed out that methodologically, my research would probably not use a collaborative planning process. Nevertheless, I quickly subscribed to their epistemological views. We agreed that understanding the value of dialogue would be useful throughout my career, especially since I will be collaborating with experts from different professional and cultural backgrounds.

By the end of my conversation with these planning theorists, it was clear that each of them had already influenced my intellectual formation. By knowing which each theory had to offer, I felt more prepared to engage in meaningful research.

PhD Qualifying Exams

Last week I took my department Qualifying Exams which test my knowledge in three areas: Planning Theory, Methods, and my Area of Specialty. I took them over the course of three days. In each area, I was given two questions and seven hours to respond. The exam was closed book and closed notes, and I did not know the questions in advance.